Equity Fund Ownership and the Cross-Regional Diversification of Household Risk by Becker, Sascha & Hoffmann, Mathias
  
 
 
Equity Fund Ownership and  
the Cross-Regional Diversification of Household Risk 
 
 
Sascha O. Becker 
Mathias Hoffmann 
 
 
 
Stirling Economics Discussion Paper 2008-25 
November 2008 
 
 
 
Online at http://www.economics.stir.ac.uk 
Equity Fund Ownership and the Cross-Regional
Diversification of Household Risk∗
Sascha O. Becker†
U Stirling, ifo, CESifo, and IZA
Mathias Hoffmann‡
University of Zurich and CESifo
November 21, 2008
Abstract
We explore the link between portfolio home bias and consumption risk sharing among
Italian regions using aggregated household level information on consumption, income
and portfolio holdings. We propose to use data on equity fund ownership to proxy for re-
gional home bias: equity funds are typically diversified at the national or international
level and will therefore provide interregional diversification. In assessing the impact
of equity fund ownership on interregional risk sharing we distinguish between two di-
mensions: variation in the share of equity funds in fund-holder’s wealth (the intensive
margin) and variation in the fraction of households that hold funds (the extensive mar-
gin). We find that equity fund ownership is an important determinant of interregional
risk sharing. First, diversification incentives qualitatively line up with actually observed
portfolio choices: fund holders in regions where households are particularly exposed to
region-specific labor income risk hold a larger fraction of their wealth in (out-of-region)
funds. Secondly, for a region as a whole, risk sharing increases in both the intensive and
the extensive margins of diversification and the two margins reinforce each other. The
marginal effect of wider equity fund participation seems particularly strong, suggesting
that policies aimed at increasing equity market participation could help foster better
interregional risk sharing.
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1 Introduction
Risk sharing between households, regions and nations has been the focus of an important
and continually growing literature over the last decade.1 Still, little is known to date about
the link between portfolio structure and consumption risk sharing at the regional level. In
this paper, we ask two questions. First, how do region-specific risks affect regional home
bias in household portfolios? And, secondly, how does household portfolio diversification
affect interregional risk sharing? By attempting to get at these issues, we hope to help close
an important gap, as we see it, between the macroeconomic literature on interregional risk
sharing and the literature on risk sharing and portfolio choice at the household level.
Our contribution is twofold: First, our regional evidence on the link between portfolio
structure and risk sharing complements existing international evidence in an important way.
In any attempt to gauge the impact of financial globalization on international risk sharing,
regional evidence serves as a natural empirical benchmark. Such a comparison was, however,
so far not possible with respect to international portfolio choice because regional evidence
on the link between portfolio structure and risk sharing virtually did not exist. We provide
such evidence here. Our results therefore provide a new perspective on the portfolio home
bias puzzle.
Our second contribution is to draw attention to the distinction between what we call
the two margins of diversification: increased participation in interregional asset markets
improves diversification along the extensive margin, whereas we refer to an increase in the
share of wealth held in out-of-region assets as improved diversification along the intensive
margin. The potential importance of this distinction has, to our reading, not been acknowl-
edged in the extant literature. In order to make the distinction between the two margins
empirically, we aggregate household level information about consumption, income and port-
folios to the regional level. Specifically, we make use of the Survey of Household Income
1Household level analyses start with Mace (1991) and Cochrane (1991) and Townsend (1994). Asdrubali,
Sørensen and Yosha (1996), Hess and Shin (2000), and von Hagen (2000) are prominent examples of papers
that have studied the extent of risk sharing between regions. Sørensen and Yosha (1998), van Wincoop
(1999) and Becker and Hoffmann (2006) have looked at risk sharing between countries.
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and Wealth by the Banca d’Italia (SHIW). The SHIW combines detailed information on
household income and consumption patterns with data on the household’s portfolio of real
and financial assets for the years 1987 to 2004, making it particularly suited for our pur-
poses here. Household level data sets do, however, not generally contain direct information
about the cross-regional allocation of household assets and the SHIW is no exception to this
rule. The key innovation we propose to overcome this obstacle is to proxy for out-of-region
equity ownership through household level information about ownership of equity mutual
fund shares. The rationale for doing so is that equity funds are generally managed at a
national or even international level, so that through ownership of mutual fund shares the
household effectively achieves interregional diversification.
Our setup allows us to tackle the two questions we asked in the first paragraph. In
our answer to the first question, our point of departure is an observation from standard
portfolio theory: ceteris paribus, a household’s incentive to invest into out-of-region assets
rises in the its exposure to local (i.e. region-specific) economic conditions.2 We find this
prediction broadly fulfilled: regions with more strongly idiosyncratic GDP fluctuations hold
a larger share of their wealth in equity funds. While there is evidence that both margins
contribute to this finding, the effect of higher participation is insignificant. But households
that already do own equity funds seem to hold more of them in regions where they are more
exposed.
So, do more diversified regions share more risk overall? Our answer to this second
question is a qualified yes. We find that consumption risk sharing with the rest of the country
is better in regions in which more households participate in funds and where households hold
a relatively large fraction of their wealth in such instruments. The interaction between the
extensive and intensive margins of diversification plays a key role: the effects of higher fund
holdings on aggregate risk sharing are much stronger when fund ownership is widespread
in the population. Over our sample period, 1987-2004, increasing the participation rate by
one percentage point would have led to an about 2 percentage point increase in aggregate
2See e.g. Lucas and Heaton (2000, Econ J.) on the role of labor income risk for portfolio choice.
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risk sharing. Conversely, the effect of inducing households to allocate a larger fraction of
their wealth to funds is much smaller. We find the intensive margin to be of significance
mainly during the bull market of the late 1990s, when unprecedentedly high participation
rates and high stock market valuations allowed many households to decouple consumption
from region-specific income shocks.
These findings suggest that stock market and in particular, equity fund participation, is
strongly associated with interregional diversification and that policies aimed at increasing
participation rates could possibly be highly effective in improving the nationwide pooling
of household level risks.
Our results also add important regional evidence to a recent literature in macroeco-
nomics and international finance that documents that portfolio diversification and con-
sumption risk sharing go hand in hand at the international level. Sørensen, Yosha, Wu and
Zu (2007) show that countries with larger international asset positions have larger cross-
border capital income flows and share more risk. Sørensen et al. therefore argue that the
equity home bias puzzle and the lack of international consumption risk sharing are twin
puzzles separated at birth. Our analysis here shows not only shows that this logic carries
over to the regional and even to the household level. It also points at the importance
of distinguishing between the two margins of diversification for understanding the impact
of financial globalization on risk sharing. To our knowledge, the role of participation in
financial markets for risk sharing has not been systematically explored.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. We describe our data and empir-
ical implementation in detail in the next section. Section three provides first descriptive
statistics on the characteristics of fund-owning and non-fund-owning households. Section
four presents our main results. We first explore a simple proposition: basic portfolio the-
ory would suggest that, ceteris paribus, a household’s incentive to invest into out-of-region
assets rises in the correlation of its labor income with region-specific economic conditions.
We show that this is indeed the case: regions where households are more strongly exposed
to region-specific risk have more fund owners and these fund owners invest a larger fraction
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of their wealth into mutual funds. We then go on to investigate whether, in turn, regions
with lower ’home’ bias achieve better risk sharing. Section five summarizes and concludes.
2 Data and Empirical Implementation
2.1 The Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW)
Our empirical analysis draws on a large-scale, public-use micro data set. The Italian Survey
of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) gathers information on household income, con-
sumption and wealth, which makes it particularly well suited for our purposes. The SHIW
is collected by the Bank of Italy, is available from 1977 onwards and has been run on a
yearly basis until 1987 (with the exception of 1985) and every other year since then (with
the exception of 1995-1998 with a 3-year gap between surveys). From 1987 onwards, the
set of questions asked to respondents stabilized, allowing for consistent analyses over longer
time horizons. We concentrate our analysis on the period 1987-2004, thus covering nearly
two decades. The sample size is about 8,000 households per survey. Apart from a small
fraction of panel households,3 the SHIW consists of repeated cross-sections. This, however,
is not a problem for our analysis here, since we are interested in regional aggregates to
understand risk sharing patterns.
We restrict our sample to households where the household head is between 26 and 62
years of age. This excludes young household and pensioners without regular labor income.4
Since we analyze risk sharing, our aim is to define an income measure that properly
reflects households’ actual exposure to idiosyncratic risk as closely as possible. The literature
discusses various risk sharing channels including fiscal transfers and asset income. We
deliberately exclude these forms of income since they may already provide some form of
insurance. We therefore use the sum of net labor income from dependent employment,
net income from self-employment (entrepreneurial income), and rental income. This ’raw’
3The number of households that can be followed for 3 or more waves is too small to allow for an analysis
of idiosyncratic household income and consumption risks over time.
4We experimented with different age ranges and results are robust when varying the minimum and
maximum age by some years.
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income concept should be a reasonable reflection of the genuine sources of income risk that
households are exposed to. We summarize the exact construction of the data we use and
some key statistics in Table 1.
From a theoretical point of view, consumption is the flow of consumption “services”
resulting from both durable and non-durable goods. Whereas the former is not available,5
non-durable goods are thought of as delivering an immediate flow of services. Non-durable
consumption is thus our preferred consumption measure.
The SHIW also contains information on ownership of various asset classes, including
government bonds, individual stocks and equity funds. This constitutes a rich data source
for studying the impact of asset ownership on consumption smoothing. Section 3 discusses
in detail how we make use of these asset wealth data for our analysis. Again, we refer the
reader to Table 1 for a synopsis.
2.2 Constructing the regional data set
We form synthetic panel groups based on region of residence and fund-owner status to ob-
tain a panel of region-year observations. Not only does this allow us to obtain a regional
aggregate of all households, but it also allows us to distinguish between fund-holding and
non-fund-holding households at the regional level. Under the sampling plan of the SHIW,
each household is assigned a weight inversely proportional to its probability of inclusion in
the sample; the weights are supposed to align the structure of the sample with that of the
Italian population with respect to several known characteristics. We use these sampling
weights in the computation of region-level per capita variables. Our construction of syn-
thetic panel groups follows Attanasio and Davis (1996), who analyze repeated cross-sectional
data from the American Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) to study the effect of rela-
tive wage movements on the distribution of consumption. Whereas they form panel groups
by birth cohorts and education level of household head, our focus on regional risk-sharing
leads us to build region-level synthetic panel groups. The use of synthetic panel groups
5One would need access to item-by-item ownership of durable goods to derive consumption “services”
under non-trivial assumptions.
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constructed from household-level data has several advantages. First, whereas individual-
level studies potentially suffer from endogeneity of income (e.g. endogenous labor supply),
grouped data averages out individual-level idiosyncracies. Secondly, and differently from
regional accounts data, our household-level data contain information on fund-owning char-
acteristics that allow us to look at different household types instead of at (only) a single
representative household, as has virtually all of the earlier literature on regional risk sharing.
Our regional entities are the twenty administrative Italian regions: 1. Piemonte 2.
Valle d’Aosta 3. Lombardia 4. Trentino/Alto Adige 5, Veneto 6. Friuli/Venezia-Giulia
7. Liguria 8. Emilia-Romagna 9. Tuscany (Toscana) 10. Umbria 11. Marche 12. Lazio
13. Abruzzo 14. Molise 15. Campania 16. Puglia 17. Basilicata 18. Calabria 19. Sicily
(Sicilia) 20. Sardegna. However, in some regions and years, the SHIW has only very few
households owning stocks or mutual funds. In addition, due to the repeated cross-section
nature of the data set these households change over time, so that it becomes virtually
impossible to form a meaningful synthetic panel group of fund-owning households for some
of the smaller regions. In our empirical analysis, we take account of this by forming some
synthetic panel groups based on aggregates over several neighboring regions. Specifically,
we merge Val d’Aosta with Piemonte, Umbria with Tuscany, Molise with Puglia, Basilicata
and Sicily with Calabria and Sardegna with Lazio. While we experimented with alternative
groupings, we note that none of our results proved sensitive to this.
3 Measuring interregional diversification through mutual fund
ownership
Our main interest in this paper is to relate cross-regional risk sharing to household level
portfolio choice. Regional portfolios are the result of decisions at the household level. In
our analysis we therefore distinguish between households that own out-of-region productive
assets (i.e. equity) and households that do not. However, unlike at the international level,
data on regional portfolios do not exist. We therefore proxy ownership of out-of-region
productive assets with mutual fund ownership. The motivation for this choice is that most
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mutual funds will hold a portfolio that is to the least nationally, if not internationally
diversified.
In this section, we first provide some descriptives on the characteristics of fund-owning
and non-fund owning households. We then suggest and discuss several measures of inter-
regional diversification that make use of fund-ownership information and that provide the
basis of our further analysis.
3.1 Mutual fund ownership: some descriptives
Table 1 gives some descriptive statistics about household owning mutual funds relative to
the average of the population.6 To compare the development of these characteristics over
time, we report numbers from the first (1987) and last (2004) year of our sample period
. The numbers suggest that owners of mutual fund shares have above average wealth
and high income. They are also more likely than the national average to be self-employed,
either in the free professions or as the owner-manager of their own or their family’s business.
However, our comparison over time clearly shows that fund holders were a more distinct
group back in 1987 than they are in 2004. Whereas in 1987, the fraction of fund-owners with
an upper-secondary schooling degree or more exceeded that of the population average by
far (75.2% vs. 39.2%), in 2004, that fraction actually falls in group of fund-owners whereas
in the population as a whole, there is a marked increase (74.8% vs. 50.1%). Similarly the
fraction of fund-owning households with self-employment income decreases from 47.3% to
30.8%. This reflects the trend for widening stock market participation and more widespread
fund holdings. Over our sample period, many relatively less aﬄuent households seem to
have gained access to equity markets as is suggested in the marked decline in net disposable
income experienced by the average fund-owning household.
Table 2 provides a summary of asset portfolio characteristics for fund-holders and non-
fund-holders. Both groups have similar ratios of real assets to total net wealth. But the
6We consider as fund holders all households that report positive mutual fund holdings. We also exper-
imented with various threshold levels, without any significant effect on any of the results reported in the
paper.
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composition of the financial asset portfolio is quite different. Fund holders hold a much
larger fraction – roundabout a third in 1987 and almost two thirds in 2004 – of their
financial wealth in ’Other securities’. This asset category includes assets that are traded in
national capital markets such as the mutual fund shares that provide the basis for our cut
at the data here, but also foreign government securities, equity held outside of funds etc.
Clearly, ownership of mutual fund shares can only be an imperfect measure of the
interregional diversification of households. While our focus here is on household ownership
of out-of-region equity, households could also own other out-of-region assets. Bonds or
deposits may help countries to smooth consumption out of current income; households
could also own productive capital in other regions directly or through ownership of a private
business. Our data set does however not allow us to identify such out-of-region ownership
of equity or – for that matter – of bonds and deposits. Nor are we aware of any outside
data that would allow us to do so. Against the backdrop of these considerations, household
information on mutual fund ownership is, therefore, almost certainly a conservative proxy
of actual interregional equity cross-holdings.
Table 3 compares the standard deviations of growth rates in (’raw’) income, consump-
tion and net wealth across the two subgroups. Our measure of consumption is household
expenditure on non-durables. This measure excludes purchases of precious objects, cars,
furniture etc. Net wealth is measured as value of real assets plus financial assets minus
financial liabilities.
As is apparent, fund-holders have considerably more volatile income and consumption
flows and much more volatile wealth than their non-fund owning counterparts – a result
that suggests that fund owners face more idiosyncratic risk than the population average.
This finding is in line with the findings reported in Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) for stock
holders.
Table 4 shows cross-regional income and consumption correlations. For each Italian
region, column 1 provides the correlation of the consumption of fund owners residing in the
respective region with that of other fund owners in the rest of Italy. Column 2 gives the
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analogous correlation for non-fund holders. In columns 3 and 4 we repeat the same exercise
for income. The cross-regional consumption correlation of fund owners is lower than that of
non-fund owners in 12 of 14 (aggregated) regions. For income this is true in 11 cases. The
average consumption correlation for fund owners is 0.096, that for other households 0.47.
For income, the respective correlations are 0.12 and 0.40.
The purely descriptive evidence in Tables 3 and 4 suggests that – as a group – fund
holders seem to face lots more idiosyncratic risk and that they achieve much less cross-
regional risk sharing than do non-fund holders. This ties in with the evidence in Tables 1
and 2 where we find that fund owners are more likely to be self-employed and hold a much
larger share of their wealth in business property. Heaton and Lucas (2000 J.Finance) have
prominently argued that proprietors constitute an important group of shareholders that is
also subject to non-insurable background risk. To the extent that fund-owners tend to be
proprietors, a higher share of fund owners may simply imply a lot more uninsurable region-
specific risk for them. In fact, Agronin (2003) provides evidence based on U.S. state level
data that regions with more small, proprietary businesses achieve less income insurance.
These findings may help rationalize the unconditional correlations we observe here.7
In this paper, we abstain from an attempt to explain why households own stocks or
mutual funds. Our approach is more modest: given that we observe that certain households
participate in stock markets – and in particular: mutual funds – we ask to what extent
cross-regional variation in the incentives to invest into out-of-region assets can explain
cross-regional variation in mutual fund ownership – both along the intensive as well as the
extensive margins. We then ask, to what extent the interaction between these two margins
can explain the relative success of a region as a whole in obtaining interregional consumption
risk sharing. We start by describing our diversification measures.
7Note that there is a version of the Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992) quantity puzzle in these household
group data: the average cross-regional consumption correlations of fund-owners is even lower than the average
correlation in their respective incomes.
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3.2 Measures of interregional diversification: intensive and extensive mar-
gins
We now use the mutual fund holding characteristics discussed in the previous subsection to
obtain measures of interregional diversification (or, for that matter: home bias). Our data
set allows us to distinguish between two dimensions of interregional diversification: variation
across regions in the the fraction of the wealth held in mutual funds by households that
already own fund measures the intensive margin. Variation in mutual fund participation,
i.e. the fraction of all households in the region that own mutual funds at all measures the
extensive margin.8
We examine two measures of diversification along the intensive margin: our first mea-
sure puts the ratio of households’ mutual fund holdings to the value of their real assets.
This measure emphasizes the weight of fund owners out-of-region (i.e. mutual fund) assets
relative to what one might consider their local assets, notably owner occupied housing. We
call this measure MFW . As a second measure of diversification along the intensive margin,
we consider mutual fund holdings relative to fund owners’ labor income. We call this ratio
MFY . As a measure of diversification along the extensive margin we use the fraction of
households in a given region that own mutual funds, i.e. the mutual fund participation rate.
Table 5 gives an overview of the regional variation in our diversification measures. As is
apparent, there is a lot of dispersion in mutual fund ownership rates across regions. Fund
ownership is much more widespread in the northern regions such as Lombardia and Emilia-
Romagna, with 13 and 15 percent respectively, whereas in the southern regions such as
Calabria, Basilicata and Sicilia less than 2 percent of households hold mutual funds.
The share of wealth held in mutual funds, be it relative to local (i.e. housing) assets or
relative to income, still varies widely across regions., but somewhat less than does the fund
participation. Furthermore, the north-south divide, while present, is not quite as clear-cut
as it appears for the participation rates. Note that the two intensity measures MFW and
8We experimented with thresholds other than zero (strictly positive fund-holdings), e.g. more than
2,000 EUR as minimum fund holdings to be classified as a fund-owning households, but results were largely
unaffected.
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MFY are also very highly correlated across regions.
4 Results
4.1 Incentives for interregional diversification and household portfolios
In examining the link between interregional risk sharing and household portfolio character-
istics we take guidance from some simple principles of portfolio theory: the more exposed
households are to region-specific risks, the lower should ceteris paribus be the share of local
assets that the household would optimally want to hold in its portfolio. Hence, the share of
out-of-region assets should increase for households that are very exposed to region-specific
risk. Clearly, this is true only to the extent that expected return differentials between assets
in the home region and in the rest of the country are zero. Given that data limitations make
an empirical approximation of such expected return differentials between regions virtually
impossible and given that we want to focus on the role of portfolio choice for hedging con-
sumption risk, we make this assumption here. We measure incentives for the inter-regional
hedging of consumption risk using two different approaches:
In the first, we gauge how exposed households’ raw income is to region-specific GDP
shocks. This provides a measure of diversification incentives at the level of household types.
In the second, we gauge how strong diversification incentives are for the region as a whole
by asking to what extent its GDP fluctuations correlate with the national aggregate. We
then use a simple theoretical model to back out implied regional portfolio weights.
We implement the first approach by a regression of household income on regional GDP
growth
∆ykit = γ
ki(∆gdpkt − ∆gdpt) + µki + vkit (1)
where ∆ykit is the growth rate of raw income for household-type i in region k and µ
ki is a
region-specific fixed effect. As discussed in the previous section, we distinguish between two
household types – the average household in region k (i = all) and those households that
hold mutual funds (i = MF ).
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We measure region specific economic conditions through the difference in GDP growth
rates between regions k and the national average, (∆gdpkt −∆gdpt). The coefficient γki can
then be interpreted as a measure of the sensitivity to local economic conditions.
The left panel of Figure 1 plots the estimates of γki for mutual fund holders (i = MF )
against the first of our intensive regional diversification measures, the ratio of mutual fund
holdings to local (real) assets (MFW ). As is apparent, there is a clear positive link between
the two variables and the regression coefficient seems highly significant. The figure highlights
the role of region-specific risk for diversification along the intensive margin:9 in regions,
where fund holders are particularly exposed to local economic conditions, they invest a
larger share of their wealth in mutual funds.
Interestingly, there is even a positive link between fund-holders degree of diversification
(the intensive margin) and average household exposure in the regions (see right panel of
Figure 1). This suggests that there is a strong correlation between the local exposures
of fund-owners and other households. The cross-sectional correlation between the γk for
fund-holders and non-fund-holders is bigger than 0.5. and highly significant. This does,
however, not imply that diversification along the extensive margin (participation rates) is
systematically higher in regions where people are strongly exposed to local economic shocks.
In the data, the link between mutual fund participation rates and exposure to local economic
conditions is insignificant. While explaining stock market participation is beyond the scope
of our analysis here, these result seem to deepen the puzzle of non-participation in equity
markets: given that diversification incentives are broadly the same for the two household
groups, it is surprising that they react so differently.
The coefficients γki are estimated from relatively short time series samples and are
therefore likely to be imprecise. The above cross-plots can therefore at best be suggestive
of a link between these variables. We attempt to solve this problem by parametrizing the
exposure coefficients γki as functions of mutual fund holdings directly. To this end, we
invert the conjectured linear relation between exposure and fund holdings underlying the
9To save space, we do not report the results for MFY graphically. The figure looks similar and the link
is is equally significant.
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cross-plots above and write
γki = γi0 + γ
i′
1 z
ik
where zik is a vector of region k household group i portfolio characteristics, γi0 is a group-
specific constant and γi′1 is a vector of coefficients. Specifically,we choose zikt to comprise
sample period averages of our intensive and extensive margin measures respectively as well
as their interactions. This parametrization for γik allows to write (1) as
∆ykit = γ
i
0(∆gdp
k
t − ∆gdpt) + γi′1 zik(∆gdpkt − ∆gdpt) + µki + vkit (2)
which in turn puts us in a position to estimate γi0 and γ
i′
1 from a panel regression. Again, µ
ki
is the fixed effect. We note that, even though in this specification, γik varies as a function
of portfolio parameters, we do not want to to interpret this relation as a causal one. We
just want to ascertain statistically that actual diversification decisions are positively related
to diversification incentives as we measure them by household exposure to region-specific
economic conditions.
We provide results for regressions of the form (2) in the first two panels of Table 6. In
the first column of the table, zik consists of the intensive margin diversification measure, in
the second column we have the extensive margin. In the third column, zik includes both
measures and in the fourth column zik is the interaction between the two measures. We
find the intuition provided by the cross-plots largely confirmed. Panel I reports the results
for mutual-fund owning households. Higher fund holdings are clearly and significantly
associated with higher exposure. The extensive margin or the interaction between the two
margins are not significant. The same picture also emerges in panel II, where we consider
all households. It is variation along the intensive margin – i.e. higher fund-holdings by
households that already hold stocks – rather than variation in the incidence of fund-holding
households that is associated with higher exposure.
We further illustrate the link between diversification incentives and actual portfolio
choices using a second approach that imposes somewhat stronger theoretical restrictions.
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Heathcote and Perri (2004) have suggested a model in which countries or regions can trade
claims that carry a dividend equal to a region’s per capita output. There is a friction in the
form of an iceberg cost on interregional dividend flows. Consumption in a region is then
a portfolio weighted average of home and rest of the country outputs (see also Artis and
Hoffmann (2008) and Crucini (1999) for similar models):
Ck = λGDP k + P k(1 − λ)(1 − τ)GDP (3)
where τ is the iceberg cost and P k is the price of a claim to region k output. Assuming that
utility is exponential and output log-normal with E(GDP kt ) = E(GDPt) = θ and variance
var(GDP kt ) = var(GDPt) = σ
2 leads to the following optimal share in home asset holdings:
λ = min
{
(1 − τ)2 − (1 − τ)ρ+ τθ
Aσ2
1 − 2(1 − τ)ρ+ (1 − τ)2 , 1
}
(4)
where A is the absolute risk aversion parameter. The min-operator ensures that countries
can not go short on foreign equity. We use this equation to calibrate optimal portfolio
shares for each region based on the correlation of its GDP growth rate with GDP in the
rest of the country 10, using a range of values for τ and the risk aversion parameter A.11
We then regress actual portfolio holdings on these calibrated portfolio weights. Panel III
of Table (6) provides the results of this exercise for τ = 0.05 and A = 1000.12 As is apparent,
there is significantly negative relation between the share of a region’s wealth held in mutual
funds and the optimal share of home assets held by the model. While the slope coefficient of
these regressions is not directly meaningful because the theoretical model is very stylized,
these results clearly line up with our earlier findings – actual patterns of interregional
10These data are taken from the CRENoS data base and are described in more detail in section 4.2 below
11The model assumes that the mean and variance of home and ’foreign’ output are identical. This as-
sumption is a good approximation for Italian regional data.
12We experimented with a range of values for τ and A.The results were not sensitive to this choice,
provided one chooses sufficiently high values of A. Values of A below 10 are are however implausible in this
setup because they lead to negative shares of home equity given the GDP correlations in the data. Another
reason to choose rather high levels of risk aversion is that our analysis focuses on the hedging demand for
out-of-region assets.
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household diversification are consistent with theoretical diversification incentives: regions
that are more exposed to idiosyncratic risk seem to hold more out-of-region assets.
From the perspective of the region as whole, it is not clear a priori, along which margin
we should expect to see diversification to work when households are highly exposed to local
economic conditions. Higher diversification incentives could find their reflection both in
higher fund ownership rates and/or in more substantial holdings of out-of-region assets.
This impression is also confirmed by our second approach to measuring diversification in-
centives: if we regress participation rates or our intensive margin measures individually on
the calibrated values of λ (last three columns of panel III in Table 6), we always find a neg-
ative sign for the coefficient, but the link is not generally significant (though the evidence
in this case would point somewhat more strongly in the direction of the extensive margin).
Our findings here broadly suggest that diversification incentives, measured through cor-
relations of labor income with region-specific GDP fluctuations, seem to line up with actual
diversification behavior at the regional level. There is evidence that stronger diversifica-
tion incentives seem to lead to higher fund holdings of those households that already own
mutual funds. There is also a slightly higher propensity to participate in funds in regions
that are subject to more idiosyncratic shocks but the effect is not significant. This may
reflect liquidity constraints, costs of participation and other obstacles to equity ownership:
while diversification incentives may well be present for many households in the region, it
is plausible that mainly those households that hold equity anyway may be able to react to
them. It is beyond the scope of the paper to explain why households participate in equity
markets. While we would argue that non-participation clearly remains a puzzle also from
an interregional risk sharing perspective, the evidence from Table 6, panel III suggests that
regional participation patterns at least qualitatively line up the direction of diversification
incentives.
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4.2 Does mutual fund ownership increase interregional risk sharing?
Our analysis so far has focused on how the structure of shocks faced by households in
different regions affects portfolio decisions. We now turn to asking what the effects of
portfolio diversification on interregional risk sharing may be. We first ask whether fund
owners as a group systematically share more consumption risk than do non-fund owners.
We then turn to the question whether regions as a whole share more risk if they have more
fund-owning households or if fund-owners hold a larger fraction of their wealth in mutual
funds.
4.2.1 Fund holders vs. non-fund holders
As our metric for risk sharing, we employ panel regressions of the form
∆cit(k) − ∆cit = βi(k)
[
∆ykit (k) − ∆yit
]
+ µki + εiut (5)
Regressions of this kind have been proposed by Mace (1991) and Cochrane (1991) as tests
of the null of complete financial markets. We propose to interpret βi(k) as a measure of how
much of the idiosyncratic labor income risk of household group i in region k systematically
spills over into idiosyncratic consumption fluctuations. In particular, if βi(k) is unity, no
risk is shared, whereas if βi(k) = 0, all risk is shared. This interpretation of βi as a metric
for risk sharing was first popularized by Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996).
We present the results obtained from regressions of this form for fund-holders and non-
fund-holders in Table 7. As is apparent, there is no major difference in the actual risk
sharing outcomes between owners of mutual funds and other households in the population.
Both groups insure between 40 and 50 percent of their idiosyncratic income shocks (the
respective βi for fund-holders is 0.57, and 0.60 for non-fund-holders). Interestingly, the
fraction of uninsured risk, βi, is virtually the same for both household groups, suggesting
that fund ownership per se – the ownership of out-of-region assets – does not necessarily
imply more or less interregional risk sharing. However, given the particular characteristics of
fund-owners as we documented them earlier, it is conceivable that an above average fraction
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of fund owners’ idiosyncratic risk is non-diversifiable. The fact that, in spite of this, the same
fraction of all idiosyncratic risk is shared may suggest that fund owners could ultimately be
able diversify a larger portion of their diversifiable risk than the population as a whole. In
this respect our results here appear consistent with the view that fund ownership provides
interregional risk sharing ceteris paribus.
4.2.2 Impact on aggregate risk sharing
To explore the link between portfolio characteristics and interregional risk sharing on risk
sharing in the region aggregate, we again consider simple risk sharing regressions of the
form:
∆ct(k) − ∆ct = β(k)
[
∆ykt (k) − ∆yt
]
+ µk + εut (6)
Note that this equation now applies to the regional aggregate and we therefore drop the
group index i in what follows. We then posit a linear relation between our (region-specific)
measure of risk sharing βu(k) and regional portfolio characteristics, so that
β(k) = β0 + β′zkt
where zkt is, again, a vector of region-specific characteristics. Plugging this relation into
(6), we obtain an equation with a set of interaction terms. Since we allow the vector of
characteristics to vary over time and across regions, the effect of the non-interacted zkt will
not be adequately captured by the region-specific fixed effect and we therefore also include
the non-interacted regional characteristics zkt into the regression which then becomes
∆ct(k) − ∆ct = β0 [∆yt(k) − ∆yt] + β′zkt [∆yt(k) − ∆yt] + δ′zkt + µk + εut (7)
The vector zikt contains our diversification measures, MFW and MFY , and the mutual
fund participation rate.
Table 8, column 1 reports the results for all households when no interaction terms are
considered. Around 55% of the region-specific income risk of the typical household remains
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uninsured. Columns 2-8 report the results for the interaction term regressions (7). The
coefficients on the interaction terms are correctly signed throughout: more diversification,
be it along the intensive or extensive margin seems to lead to more risk sharing. This is true
for both of our intensive proxies, MPW and MPY . While MPY is highly significant, the
individual coefficients on MPW and on the participation measure appear only marginally
so. However, an F-test that they are jointly zero strongly rejects the null: when consid-
ered jointly, participation and higher household level portfolio diversification do tend to be
associated with more interregional risk sharing.
We expect the impact of diversification and participation on risk sharing to reinforce
each other: if all households own mutual funds the marginal effect of an increase in MPY
or MPW on aggregate risk sharing will be higher than if only very few households hold
funds. Conversely, we would expect that wider participation induces a larger increase in
aggregate risk sharing if average fund holdings are high than if they are low. To control for
such a potential non-linearity, we also include an interaction term between our intensive and
extensive (participation) measures. Columns 7 and 8 report on this exercise . The coefficient
on the interaction term is negative for both MFY and MFW : increasing diversification
along either margin increases the impact of the other margin on aggregate risk sharing.
To check the results in Tables 7 and 8 for robustness, we rerun our regressions including
a set of control variables into zikt that theory and earlier empirical work would suggest
could have an important bearing on interregional risk sharing: an indicator of a region’s
economic backwardness and remoteness (a Mezzogiorno dummy), the fraction of households
that report positive income from entrepreneurial activity. (Heaton and Lucas (2000a,b), and
Guiso et al. (1996)) and an index of regional specialization (Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen and
Yosha (2003)). The inclusion of these variables does not generally affect our results and none
of them was found to be individually significant. To capture the potential influence of other
omitted, slow moving variables such as financial development, we also experimented with
the inclusion of a linear trend. This somewhat affects the significance of the participation
measure, apparently due to some collinearity with the general increase in mutual fund
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participation but leaves our other conclusions unaffected.
As an additional check, we obtain results similar to those in table 8 based on aggregate
regional data. So far, our findings were mainly based on household consumption and in-
come data that are aggregated up to the regional level. To make sure that our results from
these data are broadly representative, we we run our risk sharing regressions 7) , using the
micro-level information on fund holdings and participation rates, but now based on annual
growth rates of regional per capita consumption and GDP for the years 1987-2004 from
the CRENoS Regional Accounts data base Regio-IT 1970-2004 (Center for North South
Economic Research, http://www.crenos.it, see Paci and Saba, 1998). The setup of our
regression is otherwise analogous to the specification in the last column of table 8.13 The
results from this exercise are as follows: the coefficients on our diversification measures,
though numerically somewhat different, all have the same signs as in the regressions based
on household data. They are also all significant. This clearly strengthens our earlier con-
clusions: i) equity fund ownership seems to improve interregional risk sharing. ii) The
interaction between the intensive and extensive margins seems to matter for this result. We
explore next, how the contribution of these margins has varied over time.
4.2.3 Time variation in the margins of diversification
Our results on the interaction between extensive and intensive margins suggest that the
link between equity ownership and risk sharing has varied over our sample period: the
interaction between the two margins seems to matter in regression (7) which puts us in a
position to assess time variation in the marginal effect of diversification along the extensive
and intensive margins respectively. For the intensive margin measures, we have
∂βku
∂ωkt
= β1 + β3PART kt
13Since our diversification measures are observed only every second or sometimes even every third year
(1995 and 1998), the interaction terms in the aggregate regressions are based on region-specific sample
averages, so that we set zitk = z
ik for our regressions based on aggregate data.
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as measure of the marginal effect of better diversification along the intensive margin and
∂βku
∂PART kt
= β2 + β3ωkt
as marginal effect of higher participation, i.e. the extensive margin. Here, ωkt stands for
the time t share of mutual funds in fund-owners portfolio in region k, and PART kt is the
mutual fund participation rate in region k. In the remainder of this section, we report our
findings based on our first proxy, i.e. ωkt = MFW
k
t but note that all our results remain
virtually unchanged if we use MFY .
To compute the value of the marginal effects for the average region over our entire sample
period we use the time averages of the cross-sectional means of the respective variables:
PART =
1
T
∑
t
PARTt =
1
TK
∑
t
∑
k
PART kt
ω =
1
T
∑
t
ωt =
1
TK
∑
t
∑
k
ωkt
The first row of Table 9 provides the values of β1 + β3PART and β2 + β3ω along with
the p-value of an F-test that either of these effects was zero. We find that the marginal
effect along the intensive margin is −0.8 – a one percentage point increase in fund holdings
increases risk sharing by 0.8 percentage point, but this effect seems insignificant for the
sample period as a whole. Conversely, an increase in participation – the extensive margin –
increases aggregate risk sharing by more than 2 percentage points and this effect is highly
significant.
Both the mutual fund ownership rate as well as the valuation of shares and therefore the
share of wealth held in mutual funds have varied substantially over our sample period, so
that the numbers we just reported may mask considerable time-variation in the magnitude
and significance of the marginal effects. Figure 2 illustrates this point. The left panel
plots the cross-sectional mean participation rate PARTt and the one to the right the cross-
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sectional mean holdings of mutual funds in real wealth, MFWt. Both reach a peak during
the stock market boom of the late 1990s. Therefore in the following rows of Table 9, we let
the intensive and extensive marginal effects for the average region vary over time by using
the cross-regional means PARTt and ωt = MFWt to compute them. For each year, this
part of the table reports the value of the variable driving the margin (i.e. PARTt for the
intensive and MFWt for the extensive margin), the value of the marginal effect and the
associated p− value.
The effect on aggregate risk sharing along the extensive margin is between 2 and 3
percentage points for most of the sample period and, with the exception for the year 1991,
also highly significant. Conversely, the effect of higher stock holdings, the intensive margin,
is subject to considerable time variation and insignificant in all but three years – 1998, 2000
and 2002 — when it also reaches 2-3 percentage points. These are the years of the technology
bull market and the immediate aftermath, when stock market participation reached a peak,
only to drop to pre-boom levels in the years till the end of our sample.
The results here support the view that fund ownership, on the margin, does provide
interregional risk sharing, even though our results above would suggest that fund holders
do not systematically share more risk across regional boundaries. But they also show
that at least in the early part of our sample, fund holders are a special group. Widening
mutual fund ownership to households with less specific characteristics, such as high levels
of non-diversifiable background risk is therefore likely to make a big impact on aggregate
risk sharing. This suggests that widening equity fund participation may be an important
avenue through which broader aggregate risk sharing can be brought about.
5 Summary and Conclusion
Our contribution in this paper has been twofold: first, we have explored the role of in-
terregional portfolio diversification for the patterns and extent of interregional risk sharing
between households. A number of current papers are exploring the link between risk sharing
and national portfolio structure in international data. It would seem that regional evidence
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on the link between aggregate risk sharing and household portfolio choice should provide
an important benchmark for a better understanding of financial globalization. However,
virtually no evidence along these lines existed to date. Our results here help close this gap.
An important obstacle to region-level analyses of the link between risk sharing and
portfolio structure is that regional portfolio data do not exist. We suggest a solution to this
problem that is based on aggregating household level data from the Banca d’Italia Survey
of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) from 1987-2004. One of our main innovations is
to use mutual equity fund ownership as a measure of out-of-region asset ownership : equity
funds tend to be managed at the national or even international level so that purchase of
mutual fund shares implicitly leads to interregional portfolio diversification.
Our second contribution is to draw attention to the interaction between what we call
the two margins of diversification for our understanding of aggregate risk sharing: varia-
tion in the share of mutual funds in fund-holders’ wealth captures the intensive margin of
diversification. Variation in the fraction of households that hold funds (i.e. in equity fund
participation rates) is the extensive margin. Based on this distinction, we uncover a number
of interesting links between household portfolio structure and interregional risk sharing.
First, fund owners living in regions where households are particularly exposed to region-
specific labor income risk hold a larger fraction of their wealth in equity funds. Equally,
in regions that are less correlated with the national average in terms of their GDP fluctu-
ations, a larger share of aggregate household wealth is held in equity funds and it seems
that both margins of diversification contribute to this regularity. These results suggest
that interregional diversification incentives qualitatively line up with actual diversification
patterns.
Secondly, we find no major difference in how much risk is shared by fund-owning and
non-fund-owning households, even though a larger fraction of the idiosyncratic income risk
faced by fund-holders is non-diversifiable (in line with the findings in e.g. Heaton and Lucas
(2000)). Our results therefore also appear consistent with the view that mutual fund owners
diversify away a larger fraction of their insurable risk than do non-owners.
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Third, we document that regions with higher average mutual fund holdings and larger
mutual fund participation rates tend to achieve more risk sharing with the rest of the
country. Interestingly, the level and incidence of fund holdings have a mutually reinforcing
effect on risk sharing: the more widespread mutual fund holdings are, the larger is the
marginal effect on risk sharing of an increase of the fraction of fund-holders’ wealth invested
into mutual funds. These findings suggest that the link between regional portfolio structure
and risk sharing may vary in strength over time. Over our sample period, we estimate that
the marginal effects along both the intensive and extensive margins were highest during the
stock market boom of the late 1990s, when both asset valuations and participation rates
reached a peak.
Our results imply that policies aimed at increasing mutual fund ownership could have a
potentially important effect on interregional risk sharing. They also add a novel perspective
to an emerging literature in international finance that has recently started to investigate
the link between country portfolios and international consumption risk sharing. So far, this
literature has mostly focused on the impact of the recent decline in international portfolio
home bias on international consumption risk sharing. While our results here are not the
first to show that home bias is clearly not only an international phenomenon (for an early
contribution see Coval and Moskowitz (1999)), they may help shift the debate towards
the role of financial market participation – the extensive margin of diversification – for
understanding risk sharing at the aggregate level – be it between regions or countries.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics: Full sample and fund-holder subsample
1987 2004
Full Fund Full Fund
sample holders sample holders
Fund-holder (% of sample) 0.055 1 0.104 1
(0.227) (0.305)
Age 45.205 46.508 46.96 48.224
(9.729) (9.354) (9.41) (8.547)
Upper-secondary schooling (% of sample) 0.392 0.752 0.5 0.748
(0.488) (0.432) (0.5) (0.435)
Proprietor (% of sample) 0.29 0.473 0.247 0.31
(0.454) (0.5) (0.431) (0.463)
Transfer recipient (% of sample) 0.037 0.025 0.075 0.07
(0.19) (0.157) (0.263) (0.255)
Net labor income (yl) 16.803 22.46 16.039 21.251
(14.745) (22.244) (14.195) (17.765)
Pensions and other transfers (yt) 2.236 2.488 4.005 5.113
(4.825) (5.393) (7.381) (9.156)
Pensions and pension arrears 2.073 2.361 3.683 4.763
(4.7) (5.325) (7.229) (8.889)
Other transfers .163 .127 .322 .35
(1.184) (1.006) (1.758) (1.815)
Net entrepreneurial income (ym) 7.901 19.752 6.257 9.458
(17.945) (29.473) (24.876) (22.584)
Property income (yc) 4.455 13.787 5.92 11.051
(8.13) (14.413) (8.003) (14.033)
Income from buildings (yca) 3.955 9.681 5.943 9.967
(6.548) (11.482) (7.7) (13.593)
Income from financial assets (ycf) .5 4.106 -.023 1.084
(3.73) (6.36) (2.154) (4.139)
Raw income (=yl+ym+yca) 28.659 51.892 28.238 40.676
(22.374) (32.242) (29.276) (29.651)
Net disposable income excl. asset inc. (yraw+yt) 30.895 54.38 32.243 45.789
(21.938) (31.715) (28.975) (28.631)
Net disposable income (yraw+yt+ycf) 31.396 58.486 32.22 46.873
(23.07) (34.626) (29.21) (29.036)
Consumption (cn+cd) 24.602 41.534 23.993 32.39
(15.618) (22.359) (13.713) (16.515)
Non-durable consumption (cn) 21.511 35.128 21.79 29.181
(12.18) (18.361) (11.654) (14.48)
Durable consumption (cd) 3.091 6.406 2.203 3.209
(6.492) (8.515) (5.414) (6.22)
Source: Italian Survey of Household Income and Wealth shiw, 1987-2004.
Number of observations: 5,853 households in 1987, 4,776 households in 2004.
All monetary variables are in 1,000s of current EUR.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics: Portfolio characteristics of fund-
holders and non-fund-holders
1987 2004
Fund non-Fund Fund non-Fund
holders holders holders holders
Real assets 322.844 112.651 350.501 184.699
(464.666) (240.32) (540.451) (310.358)
Real estate (housing and land) 219.133 83.981 284.379 154.237
(273.602) (141.266) (315.659) (223.869)
Businesses 87.756 24.039 57.685 25.776
(326.615) (160.922) (343.269) (164.97)
Valuables 15.955 4.63 8.437 4.686
(25.432) (13.162) (30.461) (12.818)
Financial assets 67.176 19.038 64.075 15.894
(73.523) (36.643) (126.561) (50.421)
Deposits, CDs, repos, postal savings certificates 23.242 13.02 15.19 10.421
(27.766) (21.722) (27.999) (29.495)
Government securities 21.145 4.777 5.248 1.757
(32.936) (20.315) (21.342) (10.427)
Other securities (bonds, mutual funds, equity etc.) 22.789 1.241 43.637 3.715
(33.904) (11.82) (108.457) (36.256)
Financial liabilities 4.451 3.031 11.192 8.246
(14.993) (16.521) (35.571) (22.763)
Fin. liab. for purchase of real estate and other real assets 3.622 2.423 9.738 7.136
(14.396) (16.278) (35.07) (22.407)
Other Financial Liabilities 0.829 0.608 1.454 1.11
(2.799) (2.522) (4.72) (3.482)
Net wealth = Real assets + Financ. assets - Financ. liab. 385.569 128.658 403.383 192.347
(497.159) (252.247) (569.263) (323.434)
Real net wealth = Real assets - Financ. liab on real estate 319.222 110.227 340.763 177.563
(465.145) (238.695) (536.416) (305.045)
Source: Italian Survey of Household Income and Wealth shiw, 1987-2004.
Number of observations: 5,853 households in 1987, 4,776 households in 2004.
Net wealth = Real assets + Financ. assets - Financ. liab.
Real net wealth = Real assets - Financ. liab on real estate
All monetary variables are in 1,000s of current EUR.
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Table 3: Standard deviation of growth rates in consumption, income,
and wealth
Fund-holders Non-fund-holders
Non-durable consumption 0.115 0.053
Durable consumption 0.249 0.204
’Raw’ income 0.081 0.053
Wealth 0.192 0.070
Source: Italian Survey of Household Income and Wealth shiw, 1987-2004.
Standard-deviation computed over average growth rates of given variables in consecutive survey
years, separately for fund-holders and non-fund-holders.
For definition of variables, see main text and Table 1.
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Table 4: Cross-regional correlations: Fund-holders vs. non-fund-
holders
Raw Non-durable
income consumption
Fund non-Fund Fund non-Fund
holders holders holders holders
PIE+VDA 0.158 0.396 0.713 0.780
LOM -0.357 0.508 0.253 -0.033
TAA -0.169 0.164 0.752 -0.047
VEN 0.474 0.211 -0.277 0.273
FVG -0.183 0.440 0.198 0.420
LIG -0.529 -0.073 -0.323 -0.129
EMR -0.335 0.043 -0.052 0.338
TOS+UMB 0.523 0.472 0.235 0.488
MAR 0.102 0.742 -0.186 0.817
LAZ+SAR 0.228 0.511 0.418 0.520
ABR 0.270 0.218 0.603 0.653
CAM 0.455 0.707 -0.319 0.759
PUG+MOL -0.394 0.470 0.167 0.840
CAL+BAS+SIC -0.243 0.854 0.688 0.823
Average 0.000 0.450 0.205 0.464
Source: Italian Survey of Household Income and Wealth shiw, 1987-2004.
Region abbreviations are as follows: PIE+VDA denotes Piemonte and Valle d’Aosta; LOM denotes
Lombardia; TAA denotes Trentino-Alto Adige; VEN denotes Veneto; FVG denotes Friuli-Venezia
Giulia; LIG denotes Liguria; EMR denotes Emilia Romagna; TOS+UMB denotes Toscana and
Umbria; MAR denotes Marche; LAZ+SAR denotes Lazio and Sardegna; ABR denotes Abruzzo;
CAM denotes Campania; PUG+MOL denotes Puglia and Molise; CAL+BAS+SIC denotes Cal-
abria, Basilicata and Sicily (Sicilia).
For definition of variables, see main text and Table 1.
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Table 5: Extensive and intensive margins of fund ownership
Region % Fund-holders MFW MFY
PIE+VDA 0.096 0.099 0.642
LOM 0.129 0.111 0.671
TAA 0.079 0.059 0.433
VEN 0.101 0.080 0.560
FVG 0.104 0.075 0.591
LIG 0.112 0.096 0.669
EMR 0.155 0.076 0.624
TOS+UMB 0.085 0.063 0.523
MAR 0.086 0.064 0.593
LAZ+SAR 0.035 0.062 0.449
ABR 0.042 0.178 1.582
CAM 0.016 0.050 0.285
PUG+MOL 0.031 0.103 0.834
CAL+BAS+SIC 0.016 0.062 0.443
Source: Italian Survey of Household Income and Wealth shiw, 1987-2004.
Region abbreviations are as follows: PIE+VDA denotes Piemonte and Valle d’Aosta; LOM denotes
Lombardia; TAA denotes Trentino-Alto Adige; VEN denotes Veneto; FVG denotes Friuli-Venezia
Giulia; LIG denotes Liguria; EMR denotes Emilia Romagna; TOS+UMB denotes Toscana and
Umbria; MAR denotes Marche; LAZ+SAR denotes Lazio and Sardegna; ABR denotes Abruzzo;
CAM denotes Campania; PUG+MOL denotes Puglia and Molise; CAL+BAS+SIC denotes Cal-
abria, Basilicata and Sicily (Sicilia).
MFW is the ratio of funds over fund holder’s real assets (including housing).
MFY is the ratio of funds over fund holder’s raw income.
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Table 6: Interregional diversification patterns and diversification in-
centives
Panel I: Fund-owners: diversification incentives
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MFW 162.784 186.411
(56.927)∗∗∗ (58.382)∗∗∗
Participation rate -30.119 -59.867
(37.422) (37.125)
MFW * Participation rate 139.748
(399.769)
Number of obs. 112 112 112 112
R2 0.070 0.006 0.092 0.001
Panel II: Full sample: diversification incentives
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MFW 45.906 50.965
(19.951)∗∗ (20.615)∗∗
Participation rate -4.685 -12.818
(12.983) (13.109)
MFW * Participation rate 91.991
(138.168)
Number of obs. 112 112 112 112
R2 0.053 0.008 0.062 0.011
Panel III: Diversification patterns a la Heathcote and Perri (2004)
Total diversification Intensive and extensive margins
Equity fund-holdings Participation Equity fund-holdings
Dependent variable: over region-total rate over share-holder
real wealth income real wealth income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Optimal PF share λ -0.047 -0.229 -0.202 -0.095 -0.550
(0.013)∗∗∗ (0.089)∗∗∗ (0.114)∗ (0.093) (0.485)
Number of obs. 14 14 14 14 14
R2 0.502 0.359 0.208 0.079 0.097
Source: Italian Survey of Household Income and Wealth shiw, 1987-2004.
Panels I and II show coefficients γi1 from equation (2): ∆y
ki
t = γ
i
0(∆gdp
k
t −∆gdpt) +γi′1 zik(∆gdpkt −
∆gdpt) + µki + vkit
Panel III shows coefficients bx from the cross-sectional regression xk = const+ bxλk where λk is the
optimal share of home assets in region k’s portfolio and xk are the dependent variables given in the
table header.
MFW is the ratio of funds over fund holder’s real assets (including housing).
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Table 7: Unsmoothed component: Fund-holders vs non-fund-holders
Fund-holders Non-fund-holders
(1) (2)
∆yut (k) .569 .596
(.061)∗∗∗ (.060)∗∗∗
Obs. 112 112
Source: Italian Survey of Household Income and Wealth shiw, 1987-2004.
Table shows βi(k) from equation (3) in the main text: ∆cit(k) − ∆cit = βi(k)
[
∆ykit (k)−∆yit
]
+
µki + εiut.
βi(k) measures the fraction of income risk that is uninsured.
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Figure 1: Diversification incentives
Source: SHIW, 1987-2004, authors’ own calculations.
On the y-axis: fund-holdings over real wealth for fund-holders in region i. On the x-axis: γki from the following
regression of household income (yraw from Table 1) on regional GDP growth: ∆ykit = γ
ki(∆gdpkt −∆gdpt) +
µki + vkit where k=fund-owning households (left panel) or k=all households (right panel).
Figure 2: Trends in share of fund-owners and in ratio of fund volumes over
raw income
Source: SHIW, 1987-2004, authors’ own calculations.
Both panels show Italy-wide averages.
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